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Comment
Section 16(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934: Is a Vice
President an Officer?
-Drawing by S. Harris; © 1979
The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.
The purpose of this comment is to trace the eight cases involv-
ing the definition of an officer under Section 16(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act),' to point out the
errors made in the development of the law, and to suggest strong
policy reasons why future cases should be decided differently.
1. Ch. 404, tit. I, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976)).
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Several early cases, which expanded the scope and power of sec-
tion 16(b) in the late 1940's and early 1950's were unclear and in-
consistent in their analysis.2 The tests posited by these cases were
blindly applied in 1973 to greatly different factual situations to
weaken the strength of section 16(b) and move a giant step away
from the objective test Congress intended to establish.3 Most re-
cently, a 1978 case carried the logic of the 1973 cases a step further
in the wrong direction. As suggested by the cartoon at the begin-
ning of this comment, the issue involved in the 1973 and 1978 cases
is whether all vice presidents are to be considered officers under
section 16(b). Therefore, a principal focus will be whether-for
section 16(b) purposes-all vice presidents are created equal, or
whether some sharp division is to be made between "real" vice
presidents and those who by some measure are merely honorary
or titular vice presidents.
This comment will not suggest an all-purpose test, or try to find
a solution to every section 16(b) officer problem. It will, however,
argue for the assertion-by the courts, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), or the Congress--of an objective rule
which includes within the scope of section 16(b) liability any per-
son who has the title of president, vice president, secretary, treas-
urer, or comptroller in a corporation subject to section 16(b). Such
a rule would return in a limited way to an objective "crude rule of
thumb."'4 This rule would also promote public confidence in the
corporate securities market-a major goal of Congress in enacting
the Securities and Exchange Act.5
It must, of course, be recognized that objective application of
the statute has been on the decline, in favor of a "subjective" or
'"pragmatic" test, at least with regard to certain fact situations-the
so-called unorthodox transactions. 6 In such cases a subjective
analysis is made to determine whether there is a possibility of
abuse of inside information. Because of the subjectivity applied to
other elements of section 16(b), it is important that an objective
rule be applied to corporate employees designated officers under
2. See § III-A of text infra.
3. See § IV-C of text infra.
4. This famous description of section 16(b) was presented at congressional
hearings on the Exchange Act by a spokesman for the Roosevelt administra-
tion. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56 &
S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 15, 6421, at 6557 (1934) (statement of Thomas C. Corcoran). The orig-
inal "objectivity" of section 16(b) has been greatly diminished by develop-
ments of recent years. See § II of text infra.
5. See § IV-C of text infra.
6. See § 11 of text infra.
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rule 3b-2.7 Without an objective rule defining officer, a statute al-
ready weakened and far removed from the intended "crude rule of
thumb" will be further diminished in importance.
I. SECTION 16(b)-AN OVERVIEW
The Exchange Act is one of the six federal securities statutes
enacted between 1932 and 1940.8 While there had been, both in this
country and elsewhere, a move toward regulation of corporations
and their financial dealings, the stock market crash of 1929 boosted
the forces of reform around the world, and produced the direct im-
petus for the six securities statutes enacted in this country.9
The prevailing philosophy of both the Securities Act of 1933 and
the 1934 Exchange Act was disclosure-the 1933 Act centering on
the initial distribution of securities and the 1934 Act concentrating
on post-distribution trading.'0 An important tool in the regulation
of securities trading under the Exchange Act is section 16, the pro-
vision dealing with insider trading.
Section 16 "represents a threefold attack upon possible abuses
of inside information by corporate insiders."" Section 16(a) re-
quires certain insiders to report their stockholdings and transac-
tions in their companies' securities to the SEC. Section 16(c)
makes it unlawful for insiders to engage in "short sales" of their
companies' equity securities. Section 16(b) creates a cause of ac-
tion which allows any shareholder or the corporation to bring suit
to force an insider to disgorge profits made on a purchase and sale
or a sale and purchase within a six months period of their compa-
nies' equity securities. Section 16 is-thus, in part, an exception to
the general disclosure philosophy of the two statutes in expressly
providing civil liability in certain narrowly defined circumstances.
Section 16(b) states in part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1978).
8. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1933
Act]. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Exchange Act]; Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 79a to 79z-6 (1976); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb
(1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1976);
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1976).
9. 1 L. Loss, SEcuarrs REGULATION 119-20 (2d ed. 1961).
10. Id. at 130.
11. 3B H. BLOMENTHAL, SECURrrIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW 10-2 (rev. ed.
1978).
19791
736 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:733
six months,... shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespec-
tive of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or of-
ficer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or
of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months.
Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any
court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any secur-
ity of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall
fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail
diligently to prosecute the same thereafter .... 12
"Such beneficial owner" refers to section 16(a) which defines the
term as "the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any
class of any equity security [of the issuer] (other than an ex-
empted security)."u3
The section was thought to be necessary to prevent the "vicious
practices" of "flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by direc-
tors and officers of corporations who used their positions of trust
and the confidential information which came to them in such posi-
tions, to aid them in their market activities.' 4 Before the act was
adopted, this kind of profitable activity was "more or less generally
accepted by the financial community as part of the emolument for
serving as a corporate officer or director notwithstanding the
flagrantly inequitable character of such trading."' 5 The rule Con-
gress drafted was meant to exclude a great deal of potential abuse
of inside information, and to strike with certainty at the areas
where Congress considered the greatest potential for abuse of in-
side information to exist. "[TIhe only remedy which [the sec-
tion's] framers deemed effective for this reform was the imposition
of a liability based upon an objective measure of proof.' 6
The elements of a section 16(b) cause of action are concisely
stated in the following passage:
The section establishes conclusive presumptions both of access to inside
information and intention to use that information for speculative gain if
there is a showing that (1) the issuer has a class of securities registered
pursuant to section 12 of the Act; (2) there has been a purchase and sale or
a sale and purchase of the issuer's securities; (3) the related transactions
occurred within a period of less than six months; (4) an officer, director, or
beneficial owner of more than ten percent of a class of the issuer's regis-
tered securities was engaged in the transactions; and (5) there was a profit
realized on the transactions.' No actual access to inside information, intent
to engage in short swing speculation, or abuse of inside information need
be shown for the issuer to recover the insider's profits.
17
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
13. Id. § 78p(a).
14. COMM1TrEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP.
No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
15. 10 SEC ANN. REP. 50 (1944).
16. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231,235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943).
17. Comment, Insider Trading-Narrowing the Scope of Section 16(b): Foremost-
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It is not the purpose of this article to deal with the historical
developments in areas of section 16(b) not related to the officer
question; consideration of a few developments is, however, helpful.
The so-called "garden variety" transaction-a cash sale and
purchase or purchase and sale on the open market-has not
greatly troubled the courts.18 It is in the area of "unorthodox"
transactions-the acquisition or disposition of stock by merger, of
convertible securities, of stock rights and options-that the greater
part of section 16(b) litigation and discussion has taken place. 19 In
analyzing these "unorthodox" transactions, the emphasis of the
early courts on an objective approach shifted over the years to a
subjective or "pragmatic" analysis, and "has currently evolved into
the new pragmatism. o2 0 The essence of this pragmatic view of sec-
tion 16(b) is that in unorthodox transactions a case-by-case factual
analysis must be made to determine whether thir eidsts the pos-
sibility for speculative abuse of the kind at which section 16(b)
was directed.21 The result of the pragmatic approach has been the
loss of certainty in the statute's application,22 with great inconsis-
tency in the rules for differing transactions. 23 Various other as-
McKesson, Inc. v Provident Securities Co., 1976 UTAH L. REv. 400, 402-03 (foot-
notes omitted).
18. However, there have been judicial interpretation and controversy relating to
certain basic problems of the section. E.g., 3B H. BLOOmENTHAL, supra note
11, supra, § 10.05 (measuring the six month period); id. § 10.06 (measuring the
recoverable profit); id. § 10.12 (certain valuation problems). The problem of
who is subject to liability has also caused some litigation with regard to direc-
tors and more frequently beneficial owners. Id. § 10.04. The question of who
is an officer is discussed at length in §§ Ill - IV of text infra.
19. See Bateman, The Pragmatic Interpretation of Section 16(b) and the Need for
Clarification, 45 ST. JoiN's L. REV. 772 (1971); Hazen, The New Pragmatism
Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 54 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1975);
Lang & Katz, Section 16(b) and "Extraordinary" Transactions: Corporate Re-
organizations and Stock Options, 49 NoTRE DAmvE LAw 705 (1974); Comment,
Securities Law-Non-Cash Exchange Pursuant to a Defensive Merger Held
Not a Purchase or a Sale Under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934-Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 353 (1974); Note, Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance
and Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 MICH. L. REV. 592 (1974).
20. Hazen, supra note 19, at 55.
21. Id. at 2. A recent judicial application of the pragmatic approach stated that
section 16(b) liability will be automatically triggered by ordinary, voluntary
purchases and sales. It is only when either the purchase or sale is an unor-
thodox transaction that an inquiry will be made into whether or not there
was in the transaction the possibility of short term speculative abuse. Oliff v.
Exchange Int'l Corp., [1978] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) $ 96,557 (N.D. Ill. April
10, 1978) (citing Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 527
F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976)).
22. Hazen, supra note 19, at 57.
23. Comment, Exceptions to Liability Under Section 16(b): A Systematic Ap-
proach, 87 YALE L.J. 1430, 1441 (1978).
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pects of the development of section 16(b) law will be discussed as
they relate to the specific problem of the definition of officer.
I. DEFINING AN OFFICER: THE CASES
A. Early Cases: An Uncertain Beginning
The first of the eight cases which examine the definition of an
officer under section 16(b) is Colby v. Klune.24 Plaintiff, a stock-
holder of the company in question, brought suit to recover the
profit made by defendant from purchases and sales of corporate
stock within six months.2 5 There was no dispute as to the facts of
the stock transactions. Defendant relied on the allegation that he
was not a ten percent beneficial owner, director or officer, but was
only the "production manager" of the company. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.26
Plaintiff relied on rule 3b-2 which states: "The term 'officer'
means a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary comptrol-
ler, and any other person who performs for an issuer, whether in-
corporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those
performed by the foregoing officers. '27 Plaintiff argued that de-
fendant performed "functions corresponding to those performed"
by an officer.28 Defendant's affidavits stated that he acted only as
production manager and was no more than, as the district court
put it, a "superior combination of purchasing agent and personnel
manager."29 The district court also thought it significant that these
[TJhe transactional approach developed on an ad hoc basis in re-
sponse to particular transactions that did not seem to afford potential
for speculative abuse. Although the common concern has clearly
been the potential for speculative abuse of inside information, each
transaction has developed its own standards for exclusion, and the
rules established for one set of transactions have often proved inap-
propriate to another. As a result, the law of purchase and sale under
section 16(b) has become subject to all the vagaries and inconsisten-
cies of an inchoate common law.
Id.
24. 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949).
25. Colby v. Klune, 83 F. Supp. 159, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
26. Id. at 162.
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1978).
28. 83 F. Supp. at 161.
29. Colby v. Klune, 83 F. Supp. 159, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). More specifically, defend-
ant's affidavit stated that
his duties and responsibilities are to arrange for the procurement of
all the physical facilities necessary in the production of the motion
pictures produced by said corporation and ... to procure for Twenti-
eth Century Fox-Film Corporation the employees whose services are
necessary in the production of its motion pictures and to co-ordinate
their work in such production.
[Vol. 58:733
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duties were not the duties of the officers of the corporation, as
those duties were defined by the corporate by-laws. Plaintiff, how-
ever, argued that defendant had such special knowledge of the cor-
poration's affairs that he was an "insider" and should therefore be
within the scope of section 16(b). The district court rejected plain-
tiffs contention, stating that Congress had draw.An the line at "of-
ficers" and the statute was not meant to apply to all highly placed
corporate employees who arguably had access to inside informa-
tion.30
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the order for
summary judgment for defendant, finding that there was an issue
of fact, turning on credibility, which should be determined at a
trial.31 The court first "assumed for the moment" that rule 3b-2
was not authorized by the statute, and gave its own construction of
the term officer under section 16(b):32
[Officer] includes, inter alia, a corporate employee performing important
executive duties of such character that he would be likely, in discharging
these duties, to obtain confidential information about the company's af-
fairs that would aid him if he engaged in personal market transactions. It
is immaterial how his functions are labeled or how defined in the by-laws,
or that he does or does not act under the supervision of some other corpo-
rate representative.
3 3
The court thought that plaintiff should be allowed to produce evi-
dence at trial relevant to the court's definition of "officer," and spe-
cifically reserved decision on the SEC's statutory power to issue
rule 3b-2.34
Later, after expressing its strong disapproval of "trial by affida-
vit" (arguably in itself a key reason for remanding the case for
trial) the court maintained that "[iut may be that the S. E. C. had
such statutory authority to issue the Rule that it binds the courts.
Even so, there remains much room for inquiring into the facts at a
trial."35 The functions of a "vice president" or a "comptroller," the
court stated, were not self-evident and there was a need for evi-
dence concerning these positions' functions. The by-laws' defini-
30. Id. at 162.
31. 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949).
32. Id. This "momentary" assumption became one of the causes of confusion in
the line of cases dealing with the officer question, causing later courts to
question the rule. See note 102 infra. However, it seems clear the rule is
within the statutory power of the SEC to make rules and regulations, and no
court has held that the rule is invalid. See § IV-A of text infra. Indeed the
courts "assumption" of invalidity was "relegated to the purest form of dictum
by the court's conclusion that the granting of a summary judgment would
have been erroneous even if the rule were valid. . . ." Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810, 813 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
33. 178 F.2d at 873.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 875.
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tions were also deemed unimportant; instead, the relationship
between the employee's authorized activities and the corporation
was designated the factor to be examined.36 The court's conclu-
sion was similar to the SEC's position that an examination should
be made of whether or not the employee was responsible for the
policy of a substantial portion of corporate affairs or participated in
"executive councils of the corporation as an officer. '37
The first and most important point regarding Colby is that the
plaintiff sought to bring within the scope of the statute a key
corporate figure who arguably performed the function of an officer,
although without an officer's title. The policy reasons for using a
subjective, fact-oriented approach to determine whether such a
person should be covered by section 16(b) are, as discussed else-
where,38 different than the policy reasons for allowing one with the
title of an officer to escape section 16(b) liability. The concern of
Colby quite obviously was that under the district court's approach,
by a deliberate-manipulation of corporate titles and by-laws, a cor-
poration could define its employees out of the statute. The court
apparently was of the opinion that the "functions corresponding"
language of rule 3b-2 was not broad enough to prevent such a ma-
nipulation of corporate titles in contravention of the purpose of
section 16(b).
The second important point of Colby is that while the court un-
fortunately clouded the waters regarding the validity of rule 3b-2
by its "momentary assumption" of the rule's invalidity, the inquiry
it directed be made under its own definition is not greatly different
from the inquiry it and the SEC thought should be made under the
rule. Under the court's own definition of officer,39 the inquiry
would be directed at whether the employee's duties were of such a
character that the employee would be likely to obtain confidential
information that would aid him or her in personal market transac-
tions.40 Under the SEC position, the inquiry would be whether the
employee has significant policy-making powers or participated in
the "executive councils of the corporation" 4 1 and thus by presump-
tion has access to inside information. Under the rule, the court's
inquiry would be whether the functions were those of an officer, as
determined by an examination of the relation between the em-
ployee's duties and the corporation.42 While the inquiry of both
the SEC and the court under the rule would be keyed to the posi-
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See § IV of text infra.
39. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
40. 178 F.2d at 873.
41. Id. at 875.
42. Id.
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tion of the employee in terms of the corporate power structure, the
aim is clearly the same as that of the court's inquiry under its own
definition-to determine whether the employee had access to con-
fidential information useful in market transactions.
In summary, the court in Colby held that when one without the
formal title of an officer, but arguably an officer in substance, was
alleged to have engaged in short-swing trading, a factual examina-
tion should be made of the employee's position within the corpo-
rate power structure, whether he or she had policy-making
functions, and whether he or she had a position providing access to
confidential information. The court, based on sound but not ex-
plicitly stated policy grounds, extended the statute beyond those
persons with the formal title of an officer to those officers in sub-
stance. This holding is not, however, any broader than rule 3b-2.
The finding of the court was necessary to avoid making section
16(b) an empty shell enabling all but a very few employees of any
corporation to be exempt through a purposeful structuring of cor-
porate titles.
Next to examine the question was Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.
Rathman.4 3 Le. kheed, the employer-corporation, brought suit
against a former assistant treasurer who had purchased stock
under an employee stock option plan. The employee's first de-
fense was that he was not an officer under rule 3b-2. The district
court stated that, to succeed, plaintiff would have to prove that de-
fendant was a person who performed corporate functions corre-
sponding to those of one of the officers listed in rule 3b-2.44 The
court noted that the rule paralleled section 3(a) (7) of the Ex-
change Act, the statutory definition of director, which states: "The
term 'director' means any director of a corporation or any person
performing similar functions with respect to any organization,
whether incorporated or unincorporated. ' 45 Under the court's
reading of this congressional definition, "any person" meant a per-
son performing the function of a director where the corporation (or
the organization) formally had no directors. From this the court
drew the conclusion that the "any other person" language of rule
3b-2 was meant to cover only those cases in which there was no
named treasurer, but there was someone performing the treas-
urer's function who would be within the scope of section 16(b).
Because the plaintiff had at all pertinent times a formal and func-
tioning treasurer, it followed that the assistant treasurer could not
be included under the rule and thus was not within the scope of
43. 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
44. Id. at 812.




The court dismissed the "shadow" Colby cast on rule 3b-2 as
the "purest form of dictum" since Colby concluded that the grant-
ing of summary judgment would have been error even if the rule
were valid, because of the factual inquiry the rule itself would al-
low. 47 The Rathman court stated that the SEC had the statutory
authority to issue the rule, and had acted properly within the stat-
ute in promulgating the rule.48
In analyzing this decision it is again important to note that this
was a case of plaintiff trying to bring within the statute one without
the title of an officer under rule 3b-2. While the court's analysis on
either point is not a model of clarity, it is probably correct that an
assistant treasurer should not be included within the ambit of sec-
tion 16(b), at least where no substantial allegations of participation
in policy-making or of performing the treasurer's duties were
made. More importantly, for the purposes of this article, is the fact
that the court held that rule 3b-2 was a valid exercise of SEC
power, and that the Colby court's assumption of invalidity of the
rule was clearly not a holding of invalidity and was mere dictum.
The court's ultimate result-finding defendant free of liabil-
ity-was the proper decision, especially in light of the fact that
both the SEC and plaintiff had, prior to the suit, concluded that
defendant was not an officer within the scope of section 16.49
Only a year later Lockheed again brought suit against one who
had participated in its stock option plan, in Lockheed Aircraft
46. 106 F. Supp. at 812-13. It should be noted that this statement is not signifi-
cantly different from the SEC interpretation of the rule 3b-2 definition. See
notes 51-52 & accompanying text infra.
47. Id. at 813.
48. Id. An alternative basis of the court's decision for defendant was the Ex-
change Act, § 23(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1976), which prevents the finding
of liability for any act done in good faith reliance on an SEC rule or regula-
tion. Defendant, after his election as vice president and before participation
in the stock option plan, inquired of the SEC whether he was an "officer"
under section 16(a). The SEC responded that defendant should look to rule
3b-2; defendant concluded that he did not perform the functions normally en-
trusted to the treasurer, and therefore did not comply with section 16(a). The
court held that this good faith reliance on the SEC rule, would, under section
23(a) (1), have prevented recovery against the defendant even if he were an
officer under the statute or rule 3b-2 were assumed invalid. 106 F. Supp. at
814. It is interesting that both defendant and plaintiff were aware of section
16(b) and attempted to act in compliance with it. As noted above, defendant
inquired of the SEC what its definition of officer was. Plaintiff, in structuring
a stock option plan designed to prevent valued employees from being hired
away by competitors, carefully excluded the officers listed in rule 3b-2 from
its plan. After defendant left its employ, plaintiff brought this suit to recover
his profit on exercise of the option. Id. at 812, 814.
49. 106 F. Supp. at 814. See note 48 supra.
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Corp. v. Campbell.50 The defendant in this case was, and re-
mained at the time of the trial, both an assistant treasurer and as-
sistant secretary of Lockheed. The court first drew attention to the
SEC's 1940 interpretation of "officer" 51 which stated that an assis-
tant treasurer, an assistant secretary and an assistant comptroller
are not officers unless their superior is so inactive as to thrust the
burden of office upon them.52 Considering this definition, the
Colby subjective interpretation and the Rathman test, the court
found that under any of these views defendant was not an officer
under section 16(b).53 The court found, purely as a matter of fact,
"put [ting] aside any dogmatism inherent in any attempt to define,
for all purposes, terms in a statute or regulation,"54 that defendant
was merely an "administrator of people"55 and had no responsibil-
ity for financial or other corporate policy.
It should first be noted that the factual inquiry made of defend-
ant's functions again involved the plaintiff trying to bring one with-
out a rule 3b-2 officer title into section 16(b)'s scope. Using three
slightly different "tests" the court found that defendant was not an
officer for purposes of section 16(b). In addition, the court
squarely held rule 3b-2 to be a valid exercise of the SEC's rulemak-
ing power.56
It was twenty years after Campbell before the courts next deliv-
ered a reported opinion on the problem of defining an officer under
50. 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953). This decision was reached by a different
judge of the Southern District Court of California than the one deciding the
Rathman case, discussed at notes 43-49 & accompanying text supra.
51. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-2687 (Nov. 16, 1940). Although
the purpose of the release was to compare the Investment Advisors Act of
1940 reporting forms with forms under the Exchange Act, and the discussion
of officer in the release in fact related to the definition of officer under the
Investment Advisors Act forms, the court treated it as an interpretation of
rule 3b-2, apparently because the definition of officer on the forms and that of
rule 3b-2 were identical. Id.
52. It is the opinion of the General Counsel of the Commission that an
assistant would be an "officer" if his chief is so inactive that the assis-
tant is really performing his chief's function. However, as assistant,
although performing some functions which might be those of his
chief, would not be an "officer" so long as these duties were under
the supervision of his chief. Temporary absence or brief vacation of
an officer during which an assistant performs the officer's duties
would not constitute the assistant an "officer." Subject to the forego-
ing, assistant treasurers, assistant secretaries, and assistant comp-
trollers, for example, are not to be considered "officers" for purposes
of this definition.
Id.
53. 110 F. Supp. at 284-86.
54. Id. at 284 (emphasis in original).




section 16(b). The base provided by this cluster of early cases was
obviously uncertain and inconsistent. Each case purports to take a
distinct approach, although the substance of each factual inquiry is
not markedly different. Because, of the three, only Colby was an
appellate decision, it of course has had the strongest impact on
later cases. Lacking from all three cases was a discussion of sound
policy reasons for departing from the objective application of the
statute and rule 3b-2 for a more "factual," case-by-case decision
about who is a section 16(b) officer. However, the implication of
the cases is that in the absence of a subjective test to examine the
real function of an employee without a rule 3b-2 title, the statute
would be too easily avoided by a change of formal appellation.
None of the three cases contemplated the factual situation to
which the language of the decisions would later be applied-that of
persons within the literal definition of rule 3b-2 seeking escape
from section 16(b) liability. These three cases, especially Colby,
were resurrected in 1973 to further confuse the definition of officer.
B. 1973 Decisions-Misapplication of the Early Cases
Early in 1973, Schimmel v. Goldman57 was decided by the
Southern District Court of New York. Plaintiff was a shareholder
of the corporation, of which defendant was a vice president. The
issue in the case was whether the defenses were sufficiently meri-
torious to justify payment of seventy-two percent of the maximum
section 16(b) recovery as a full settlement of the section 16(b)
claim.58 One of the grounds on which the court approved the set-
tlement as fair and reasonable was that the court found defendant
presented a substantial question as to whether he was an officer
under section 16(b) and rule 3b-2 in spite of his title of vice presi-
dent.59
The SEC filed a brief as amicus curiae in the action and argued
that defendant's position was far too weak to justify a substantial
discount. 60 While Colby made a factual inquiry under the assump-
tion that rule 3b-2 might not be valid, and the Rathman and Camp-
bell courts made similar factual inquiries, those were cases, the
SEC contended, in which the person in question did not have an
officer's title under the SEC definition.6 1 Under rule 3b-2 itself
57. 57 F.RPD. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The four 1973 cases discussed in this section are
taken in order of the date of decision.
58. Id. at 482. The other ground of decision related to computation of the section
16(b) profit in the option context. Id. at 484-85.
59. Id. at 485-86. The court did not discuss what the duties of the defendant were,
mentioning only that he was a vice president.
60. Brief for the SEC, Amicus Curiae, at 6.
61. Id. at 8-9.
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there could be a factual inquiry into the functions performed by a
person, but only when the person did not bear an officer's title.
Further, no court, the SEC stated, had found rule 3b-2 to be in-
valid.62 Arguing for the use of a purely objective application of the
rule when one bears the title of an officer, the SEC stated: "If that
person wishes to enjoy the prestige of the office, he shares its re-
sponsibilities under Section 16."63
The court, however, ignored the crucial distinction between
Colby, in which the defendant was not formally an officer but ar-
guably performed the policy and executive functions of an officer,
and Schimmel in which the employee was formally a vice presi-
dent. Considering both elements of the defense, the court found
that it was substantial enough to warrant the settlement. The
court blindly assumed that the Colby test of the function of the
employee in the particular company, and the SEC test of whether
the employee performed policy-making functions, applied to this
fact pattern as well as to the facts of the three early cases. As dis-
cussed more fully later, critical policy differences exist between
the two situations which prevent the Colby language from being
applicable to the Schimmel facts.64
Selas Corp. of America v. Voogd 65 was the next officer case to
be decided. In it the court granted summary judgment for the
plaintiff corporation, which had brought the section 16(b) action
against its executive vice president for international operations.
The court first stated that the validity of rule 3b-2 had "not been
clearly established," 66 but noted that under it, as a vice president,
defendant would clearly be within the scope of section 16(b). De-
fendant claimed that under Colby, Schimmel, and Gold v.
Scurlock,67 he was not a section 16(b) vice president. However,
the court found that these cases would not assist defendant. Plain-
tiff's affidavits stated that defendant was the chief operating officer
of the most important section of plaintiff's business and was one of
the most active members of its executive committee. Defendant's
affidavits stated that he was a mere "figurehead" but he did not
62. Id. at 8.
63. Id. at 7.
64. See § IV of text infra. The court also relied on Gold v. Scurlock, 324 F. Supp.
1211 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd in part on other grounds and rev'd in part sub nom.
Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), pet. for rehearing en banc denied,
491 F.2d 729, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974), which similarly applied the
Colby rule. The Fourth Circuit decided the case on different grounds, re-
jecting the district court's analysis, and considering only the question of
whether the transactions involved were section 16(b) purchases. See notes
70-86 & accompanying text infra.
65. 365 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
66. Id. at 1270.
67. See note 64 supra.
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dispute the detailed facts of plaintiff's affidavits. 68 Concluding that
there was no material issue of fact, the court granted summary
judgment for plaintiff. In so doing the court assumed that the law
would allow a factual inquiry under these facts had a material is-
sue of fact been shown. 69
This was a case, as was Schimmel, in which one with the title of
vice president sought to excuse himself from section 16(b) liabil-
ity. The court avoided the question of whether the SEC or the
Schimmel view on the question was correct by stating that either
way summary judgment should be granted for plaintiff. Although
resulting in judgment for plaintiff, this case shows that the door
opened by Schimmel would lead many defendants, even when un-
der any analysis within the scope of section 16(b), to litigate in the
hope that settlement might be the result. Instead of a simple and
objective application of section 16(b) to vice presidents, another
avenue of delay, and thus a weapon to discourage suit by share-
holders and corporations, was opened. The "crude rule of thumb"
of section 16(b) thus suffered another splinter.
Further confusion was added by the Fourth Circuit in Gold v.
Sloan.7 0 While the district court decided the case on the basis of a
Colby-like subjective test of whether defendants were "officers"
(all three were vice presidents), 7 1 the circuit court decided the
case only on the basis of whether the purchase transaction (a
merger) was a section 16(b) purchase.72 Unhappily, the district
court's opinion was relied on by other courts before the circuit
court decided the case,73 and the basis of the circuit court's opinion
was later misunderstood by a commentator as well as a court.74
68. 365 F. Supp. at 1271.
69. Id.
70. 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), pet.for rehearing en banc denied, 491 F.2d 729, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
71. Gold v. Scurlock, 324 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Va. 1971), affd in part on other
grounds and rev'd in part sub nom. Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, pet.for rehear-
ing en banc denied, 491 F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873
(1974).
72. 486 F.2d at 342.
73. Both Schimmel v. Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), see notes 57-64 &
accompanying text supra, and Selas Corp. of America v. Voogd, 365 F. Supp.
1286 (E.D. Pa. 1973), see notes 65-68 & accompanying text supra, relied in part
on the district court opinion in Gold. The district court's analysis was re-
jected by the Fourth Circuit, which considered the case after Schimmel and
Selas were decided.
74. Comment, Who is an "Officer" under Section 16(b)-Who Knows?, 12 SAN Di-
EGO L. REV. 378, 397 (1975), and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Livingston, 566 F.2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1978), each erroneously read the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Gold as being based on the question of whether
defendants were officers. The circuit court actually decided only one is-
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This misplaced reliance on each of the Gold opinions is an unfor-
tunate complicating factor in the law of section 16(b).
The district court in Gold discussed three defendants who were
vice presidents, Glenn L. Sloane, Daniel McBride and Keith E.
Rumbel.7 - Each defendant was a vice president of Atlantic Re-
search Company (ARC). Upon merger with Susquehanna Corpo-
ration (SC), Sloane and McBride became vice presidents of SC,76
but Rumbel was only a vice president of the Atlantic Research
Group, a divison of SC.7 7 The district court first held that the
transaction in which each defendant obtained his SC stock-the
merger of ARC into SC-was a section 16(b) purchase.7 8
Without citing authority, the district court made a factual in-
quiry into the nature of each defendant's duties. The court found
that McBride and Sloane were officers in both name and fact and
held them liable.7 9 With regard to Rumbel, however, the court
found that his duties in both ARC and SC were "mere staff func-
tions-routine administrative chores."80 It stated: "[B] eing a cor-
porate officer without portfolio does not per se make him an
'insider' as contemplated in Section 16(b) . . . ." and held him not
sue-whether each defendant's acquisition of stock by merger was a section
16(b) purchase. 486 F.2d at 342.
75. Two other defendants, Arthur W. Sloan and Arch C. Scurlock, were both di-
rectors and 10% owners of ARC and were 10% owners of SC. 324 F. Supp. at
1214. They will not be discussed further in this comment.
76. Id. at 1215.
77. 486 F.2d at 358.
78. 324 F. Supp. at 1215. The circuit court disagreed on this crucial point, holding
that a separate inquiry must be made regarding each defendant to determine
whether his purchase was a section 16(b) purchase. The circuit court's ap-
proach was prompted by Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), handed down after the Gold district court decision.
Kern involved the disposition of stock by a "corporate raider" which had lost
a takeover attempt when the target corporation completed a "defensive
merger." On the question of whether the disposition of stock by the corpora-
tion which had lost the takeover battle was a section 16(b) sale (the disposi-
tion was an exchange of target stock for the stock of the corporation into
which the target was merged), the court applied a pragmatic test-
The statutory definitions of "purchase" and "sale" are broad and, at
least arguably, reach many transactions not ordinarily deemed a sale
or purchase. In deciding whether borderline transactions are within
the reach of the statute, the courts have come to inquire whether the
transaction may serve as a vehicle for the evil which Congress sought
to prevent-the realization of short-swing profits based upon access
to inside information ....
Id. at 593-95 (footnotes omitted). The court held that the stock disposition
was not a section 16(b) sale because of the absence of possibility of specula-
tive abuse of insider information and the involuntary nature of the defend-
ant's exchange. Id. at 600. See also Comment, supra note 19.




liable.81 It was this last statement that was relied on by Schimmel
and Selas before the Fourth Circuit rejected the Gold district
court's decision.8
2
Two years later when the Fourth Circuit decided the case, it
made clear that only one issue was being decided: "The only issue
in the cases is whether the exchange by the defendants of their
ARC stock for [SC] stock pursuant to the merger constituted a
'purchase'.... 83 The court adopted the Kern test regarding the
merger transaction, examining whether "the specific transaction it-
self, which constitutes the unorthodox transaction, presents the
possibility of, or potential for, exploitation of insider informa-
tion."84
Applying this test to whether the exchange of stock in the
merger by Rumbel and Sloane-McBride did not appeal-was a
section 16(b) purchase, the court held that there was no section
16(b) purchase on the part of either defendant.85 In so doing the
court vacated the district court's finding of liability as to Sloane
and affirmed the finding of non-liability as to Rumbel, noting that
the district court's finding on Rumbel was based on the ground
that he was not a section 16(b) officer, "the correctness of which
we find no need to examine. 8 6
Since the district court's opinion in Gold was rejected by the
Fourth Circuit, it is of no precedential value to the officer question.
However, consideration of both cases is necessary to an analysis of
the officer definition under section 16(b) because of the frequent
misunderstanding of both the district and circuit court opinions.
The last of the 1973 cases, also involving a proposed settlement,
was Morales v. Holiday Inns, Inc.87 Plaintiff, a shareholder of Holi-
day Inns, brought to the company's attention alleged violations on
81. Id.
82. See note 73 supra.
83. 486 F.2d at 342.
84. Id. at 343 (footnote omitted, emphasis in original). The propriety of the ap-
plication of Kern where the merger transaction was the section 16(b)
purchase (Kern itself discussed an "unorthodox" cash tender-offer transac-
tion which was the section 16(b) sale) was disputed by the dissenting opin-
ion. Id. at 353-54 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 351.
86. Id. Regarding Rumbel, the dissent, which disagreed with the court's applica-
tion of the Kern rule, see note 84 supra, would have found non-liability on the
basis that Rumbel was only a vice president of a division of SC at the time of
the sale, not of the issuer itself. The dissent relied on a literal reading of rule
3b-2 which speaks of officers of "the issuer." Id. at 358 (Winter, C.J., dissent-
ing).
87. [1973] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94, 219 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1973).
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the part of a corporate vice president.88 The company, after con-
sidering plaintiff's contention, announced that it would settle the
claim for seventy percent of the section 16(b) liability, because "al-
though [defendant] is listed in corporate records and SEC filings
as a Vice-President, he is not an officer, within the meaning of sec-
tion 16(b). ' '89 Plaintiff shareholder thereupon filed the action. In
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the district court stated
that the issue before it was whether defendant's argument that he
was not a section 16(b) officer was substantial enough to justify
the settlement proposed by the company.90
The court stated that Colby put, for the Second Circuit, a
"gloss" on the meaning of officer, requiring application of a test
which inquires whether the defendant is an employee performing
such important executive duties that he would be likely, in dis-
charging these duties, to obtain confidential information about the
company's affairs that could aid personal market transactions. 91
Applying this test, the court found that as a vice president and "Di-
rector of Inn Operations" defendant probably had access to impor-
tant corporate information which would aid him in personal
market transactions. The court held that the settlement was not
one of which it would approve, and in the shareholder's action, or-
dered summary judgment for plaintiff and payment by defendant
of 100 percent of the section 16(b) liability.92
The case summarizes the state of the law as of 1973. The Colby
test was erroneously applied to a fact situation far different from
that before the Colby court. The application of the Colby test to a
defendant with the title of a rule 3b-2 officer discards the certainty
of an objective rule, and thereby encourages frivolous litigation
-like Morales-when the drafters envisioned a quick and auto-
matic imposition of liability. In other words, the unclear state of
the law on this point allows defendants to use the threat of litiga-
tion on the question as a lever to force settlement for a percentage
of the claim. If a defendant loses completely he or she merely
loses the profit on the transaction; if settlement is obtained, de-
fendant "gets away" with part of the profit.
C. 1978-A Further Retreat from Objectivity
Based on the uncertain and misleading cases of 1973, the most
recent officer case carried the law yet another step further away
88. Another officer involved paid his section 16(b) liability in full and was not
involved in the district court's opinion. Id.
89. Id. at p. 94,901.





from the ideal "rule of thumb." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., v. Livingston,93 decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, stated that the title "vice president" does no more than
raise an inference of "opportunities for confidential information"
and thus of section 16(b) liability.94
The court, in a terse opinion, reached this conclusion in two
short and simplistic steps, completely ignoring rule 3b-2. Relying
on Colby, the court stated that "[t]o achieve the beneficial pur-
poses of the statute, the court must look behind the title of the
purchaser or seller to ascertain that person's real duties."95 While
recognizing that Colby involved a person without the title of an
officer who under a factual analysis clearly was in substance an
officer of the corporation, the court did not take note of the factual
and policy differences between that fact pattern and the case
before it. In this case, of course, a person with the formal title was
allowed to escape section 16(b) liability using a Colby-type analy-
sis. Perhaps more alarming than the application of the Colby test
to the facts of this case is the broad language of the court's above
quoted statement, which would seem to mandate the application of
the test to every defendant, no matter what his or her title and
place on the organizational chart.
The second step of the court's analysis relied on Gold. The
court stated that "[j]ob labels were no more significant to the
Fourth Circuit in Gold"96 than to the Second Circuit in Colby. In
noting the Gold court's statement that defendant's job label was
merely "titular," and that he was ignorant of the merger there in-
volved, the court failed totally to recognize the issue before the
Gold court. The issue before the court was not whether the de-
fendant was a section 16(b) officer, but rather was, as clearly
stated by the Fourth Circuit,97 whether the unorthodox purchase
in the form of a merger was a section 16(b) purchase.
Upon these two steps the Ninth Circuit reached its conclusion
that the title of vice president raised only an inference of insider
status, and that the inference could be overcome "by proof that the
title was merely honorary and did not carry with it any of the exec-
utive responsibilities that might otherwise be assumed."98 Apply-
ing this new test to the facts, the court found that the defendant
was not a section 16(b) officer and thus was not liable to return his
93. 566 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1978).
94. Id. at 1122.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340,342 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
See notes 70-86 & accompanying text supra.
98. 566 F.2d at 1122.
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profit to the corporation.99
Of all the vice president cases, the facts of Merrill Lynch are
those most strongly in favor of the subjective rule. According to
the court the company had some 350 "executive vice presidents"
who performed executive and managerial functions, and who pre-
sumably would be within the scope of section 16(b) under the
court's analysis. The defendant, however, was one of some forty-
eight persons who were account executives but who had been
awarded the title of vice president as part of an "Account Execu-
tive Recognition Program"1 0 0 without a change of their account ex-
ecutive duties. The title in this case was plainly honorary.
Nonetheless, the holding of a formal title should bring to bear pol-
icy considerations which require section 16(b) liability to be im-
posed.10 ' Rather than erode the rule to accommodate a
corporation with 400 vice presidents, the titles should be changed
to accommodate the law-if the corporation wishes the employees
to avoid coverage by section 16(b).
IV. A VICE PRESIDENT IS AN OFFICER-POLICY FOR A
FRESH START
As the foregoing review of the officer cases reveals, the subjec-
tive analysis made by Colby and the other early cases to bring
within the scope of section 16(b) one in substance an officer
though without the title, was applied in 1973 and 1978 to persons
bearing an officer's title but arguably without the substantive du-
ties of office. This section will demonstrate that a subjective test
should never be applied on the question of whether one is an of-
ficer when that person bears the title of vice president, president,
secretary, treasurer or comptroller under rule 3b-2. First, the lack
of clarity in the subjective analysis of whether one is an officer en-
courages short-swing speculation and fosters litigation or an at-
tempted settlement by persons clearly within the intent of the
statute. Second, strong policy reasons which underlie the stat-
ute-especially the need to promote public confidence in corporate
securities-require that those persons with a corporate title not
engage in short-swing speculation. In short, if section 16(b) is to
99. One member of the three judge panel dissented. Under his analysis, the title
of vice president created a presumption of executive duties and access to
confidential information. While the presumption could be overcome, the dis-
senter would have left that decision to the trier of fact, especially when, as
here, a full-fledged trial was held and the outcome depended upon inferences
to be drawn from documentary evidence and oral testimony. The dissenting
opinion would have affirmed the district court's finding of section 16(b) liabil-
ity. Id. at 1123-24 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
100. 566 F.2d at 1121.
101. See § IV of text infra.
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have meaningful application to vice presidents in the future, objec-
tivity must be regained.
A. Rule 3b-2 is Valid
Rule 3b-2 is a valid exercise of the SEC's rulemaking power
under the Exchange Act. Its validity would probably not have
been called into question but for the "momentary assumption" of
invalidity made by Colby. 0 2 Under any reading of Colby it is clear
that the court did not hold the rule to be invalid. 103
Rathman0 4 recognized the statement on the validity of rule 3b-
2 in Colby as the "purest form of dictum,"' 0 5 while Campbell'0 6
squarely held the rule to be a valid exercise of SEC power. 07 As
the SEC stated in its Schimmel brief in 1973, "no case has found
Rule 3b-2 to be invalid," and "this rule is a valid implementation of
the Commission's power to define technical, trade and accounting
terms in the Exchange Act."' 0 8
Thus the rule, until held invalid, may be taken as a lawful exer-
cise of SEC power. Indeed, Colby advanced no developed argu-
ment to support its temporary assumption of invalidity, nor have
the courts which recognized the "gloss" Colby was thought to have
placed upon the rule. On the other hand, it seems that Congress
implicitly intended to leave to the SEC the power to determine the
definition of officer. That this was a conscious decision is sup-
ported by the fact that Congress did take care to define other
102. See text accompanying note 33 supra. It is very important to remember that
the Colby court implied that its reason for questioning the rule's validity was
concern that it unduly restricted the scope of section 16(b). The court stated
a test of its own which made a factual inquiry beyond the scope of what the
court thought rule 3b-2 allowed, to include within the statute one not literally
a rule 3b-2 officer.
103. However, some cautious district courts have taken Colby almost as if it had
held the rule invalid. See, e.g., Selas Corp. of America v. Voogd, 365 F. Supp.
1268, 1270 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (validity of rule "not clearly established"); Schim-
mel v. Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (defendant-vice president
free to contest insider status "despite . . . Rule 3b-2"); Morales v. Holiday
Inns, Inc., [1973] FED. SEC. L. Rrm. (CCH) 94,219 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1973)
(statute as interpreted by rule "clear"; but Colby put "gloss" on meaning of
"officer" requiring factual inquiry).
104. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See
notes 43-49 & accompanying text supra.
105. Id. at 813.
106. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
107. Id. at 286.
108. Brief for the SEC, Amicus Curiae, at 7, Schimmel v. Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). Exchange Act, § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1976), states in
part: "The Commission ... shall have power by rules and regulations to de-
fine technical, trade, accounting, and other terms in this title, consistently
with the provisions and purposes of this title."
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terms, for example "director," in the Exchange Act. 0 9 Further,
Congress left the definition of officer to the SEC under other secur-
ities statutes, o10 supporting the inference that the omission of the
definition from the statute was consciously intended by the draft-
ers and Congress. Evidence that the SEC took care to follow the
purpose and spirit of the statute is given by the structure and lan-
guage of the rule which closely follows the statutory definition of
director.'' It therefore is reasonable to assert that the rule is
within the power of the SEC under the Exchange Act," 2 that it
follows the intent of Congress, and is therefore a legally binding
rule.
B. Policy for Including All Rule 3b-2 Officers Within the Scope of
Section 16(b)
It bears restating that Colby and the other two early cases,
Rathman and Campbell, each involved expansively reading the
statute and rule 3b-2 to bring persons not designated officers
within the scope of section 16(b) (under the rule's definition). The
concern of the Colby court apparently was that the rule would be
read literally, and that by a mere shifting of titles people with very
real policy-making and executive power would avoid liability.
The point of concern-largely overlooked by the recent officer
cases-is that there are very different policy reasons for using a
subjective test to excuse from liability one with the title of vice
president than in seeking to include a "non-titled" person within
the scope of the statute. The Colby approach of a subjective, fac-
tual analysis does have a place in bringing within the statute per-
sons who engage in transactions in corporate stock who have the
kind of corporate position Congress meant to include within sec-
109. Exchange Act, § 3(a) (7), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (7) (1976) states: 'The term 'direc-
tor' means any director of a corporation or any person performing similar
functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unincor-
porated."
110. See, e.g., Public Utility Holding Companies Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1976);
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1976). As with the Ex-
change Act, each of the statutes does define the term "director." Public Util-
ity Holding Companies Act of 1935, § 2(a) (15), 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a) (15) (1976);
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 2(a) (12), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (12) (1976).
111. '"The term 'officer' means a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary,
comptroller, and any other person who performs for an issuer, whether incor-
porated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by
the foregoing officers." Rule 3b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1978). Note how
closely the rule tracks the language of the statutory definition of "director."
See note 109 supra.
112. 15 U.S.C. 78c(b) (1976).
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tion 16(b). 113 However, that subjective approach need not be ap-
plied "both ways." While such a test may properly be applied to
further the goal of the statute, it should not be used to derogate the
"bright-line" objectivity that Congress intended be applied to
those the SEC would define as officers." 4 Two major policies
which are central to the theme of section 16 (b) militate against the
application of a subjective test to those who are formally officers.
1. The Need for Objectivity
Section 16(b) was meant as a "crude rule of thumb."" 5 It was
designed to work in a mechanical, objective way; rule 3b-2 was
promulgated shortly after the statute was adopted to assist that
goal. As one of the most frequently cited early cases on section
16(b) stated: "It is apparent too, from the language of section 16(b)
itself, as well as from the Congressional hearings, that the only
remedy which its framers deemed effective for this reform was the
imposition of a liability based upon an objective measure of
proof.""16 It is also clear from the statute that Congress, while hop-
ing to prohibit the practices it considered "vicious," wanted a rule
narrow in scope. That the statute was limited to ten percent or
greater beneficial stockholders, directors and officers, to purchases
and sales, or sales and purchases within six months, and that only
the profit made and no penalty as such was to be paid over, show
the narrow scope of the statute. As interpreted by rule 3b-2, the
statute was not broadened, and indeed the worry of Colby seemed
to be that the rule too strictly construed the statute.1 17 The fact
that Congress chose a narrow statute provides no support for the
113. It may be argued, however, that Congress, in seeking an objective, narrowly
defined statute, did not intend to have section 16(b) expanded in this way.
114. Mr. Justice Douglas recognized in his dissent to Kern that while a subjective
or "pragmatic" approach properly could be utilized to include within the stat-
ute transactions which evidence the "evil" Congress sought to prohibit, it is
not proper to apply such a pragmatic test to destroy the "bright line" Con-
gress drew.
It is one thing to interpret the terms "purchase" and "sale" liberally
in order to include those transactions which evidence the evil Con-
gress sought to eliminate; it is quite another to abandon the bright-
line test of § 16(b) for those transactions which clearly fall within its
literal bounds. Section 16(b), because of the six month limitation,
allows some to escape who have abused their inside information. It
should not be surprising, given the objective nature of the rule, if
some are caught unwillingly.
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 61Z (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
115. See note 4 supra.
116. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943).
117. See notes 38-42 & accompanying text supra.
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further subjective narrowing the 1973 and 1978 cases describe, and
indeed weighs against any further restriction of the statute.118
The move away from objectivity is "inevitably a weakening
process." 1 9 The validity of this statement is shown by the attempt
of vice presidents who were clearly within the scope of the statute
to escape liability (or at least "settle" the claim by keeping some of
their profit) as in Selas120 and Morales.12 1 The result of the recent
officer cases using a subjective test with regard to vice presi-
dents-in language broad enough to apply to any rule 3b-2 of-
ficer-has indeed been such a "weakening process" as objectivity
has diminished. Indeed, the cases have resulted in the encourage-
ment of litigation where none should be possible under the spirit
of the statute. A statement by Justice Douglas expressing concern
over undue subjectivity in the statute well applies here:
Instead of a section that is easy to administer and by its clear-cut terms
discourages litiagation, we have instead a section that fosters litigation be-
cause the Court's decision holds out the hope for the insider that he may
avoid section 16(b) liability. [This subjective approach] destroys much of
the section's prophylactic effect.1 2 2
2. The Promotion of Public Confidence in the Capital Markets
and Corporate Management
The second major policy consideration which militates against
the subjective approach with regard to rule 3b-2 officers is that the
section was intended to restore public confidence in the securities
markets. This purpose is damaged when persons publicly desig-
nated vice presidents are allowed to make short-swing profits in
the securities of their companies. First the nature of this policy
will be described. Second the way insider trading by vice presi-
dents may harm this policy will be discussed.
A major purpose of the Exchange Act was to restore public con-
118. Large areas of "insider" conduct were consciously left untouched by
Congress for reasons dictated by practicalities rather than ethics or
pure logic. A line had to be drawn somewhere by the lawmakers, as
they must do in the law of marriage, divorce, legitimacy, real estate,
wills and a host of other subjects governed by statute. But the con-
sciously limited statute is no reason for us to seek yet further limita-
tions of what is remedial legislation.
Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
119. "[Tlhe recognized purpose and aim of the statute are more consistently and
protectively to be served if the statute is construed literally and objectively
rather than non-literally and subjectively on a case-by-case application. The
latter is inevitably a weakening process." Petteys v. Butler, 357 F.2d 528, 538
(8th Cir. 1966) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. See notes 65-68 & accompanying text supra.
121. See notes 87-92 & accompanying text supra.




fidence in the nation's securities markets. 123 The insider trading
provision was especially directed at this concern. Several years af-
ter the statute took effect, an American Bar Association committee
which recommended the retention of section 16 (b) gave its opinion
that "[a] persistent cause of lack of public confidence in the ex-
changes has been the public impression that they can be traded in
profitably only by persons specially informed."'124 Such a lack of
public confidence-especially on the part of small investors-is
still a matter of concern. A recent commentator noted a "dismal
lack of public participation 125 in the stock market of the present
day. One reason given for this lack of participation was that the
individual investor had simply become convinced that he did not
trade in the market on equal terms with large investors and those
with non-public information. 126 Such insider trading also has the
potential for eroding shareholder confidence in corporate manage-
ment'12 7
The theme of the importance of public confidence to public par-
ticipation in securities trading-a major goal of the Exchange Act
and its section 16(b)-has also been sounded in response to the
defense of the social and economic benefits of uninhibited insider
trading.128 Professor Loss' rebuttal to the position that insider
123. 'This legislation is absolutely necessary for the best interests of the Nation,
because not until we pass the measure will confidence [in the stock ex-
changes] be restored." 78 CONG. REc. 7689 (1934). "If investor confidence is
to come back to the benefit of exchanges and corporations alike, the law must
advance." H. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934). The specific purpose
of section 16 was to encourage "[a] renewal of investors' confidence" in the
markets and management. Id. at 13.
124. Report of the Special Committee on Securities Laws and Regulations, 66
A.B.A. REP. 340, 357 (1941).
125. McElroy, Pragmatic Disgorging of Insider Profits: A Review of Cases Re-
ported Under Section 16(b), 7 ST. MARY'S LJ. 473 (1975).
126. Id. The author supported the quoted statement by drawing on testimony of
Paul Kolton (then President of the American Stock Exchange) in Schumate
& Co. v. American Stock Exchange, No. 3-4708-D (N.D. Tex., filed April 22,
1971). Commenting on the need for a reversal of this trend, and proposing a
new emphasis on section 16(b) as an instrument to foster such change, the
author stated: "Any instrument to help bring the public back into the market
must therefore be seen to have a renewed importance when securities ex-
changes no longer function in their quest to raise equity capital for corporate
expansion." McElroy, supra note 125, at 473.
127. The dissent in Merrill Lynch recognized this "public image" purpose of sec-
tion 16(b). "Because the taint of short swing trading by a vice president
causes subjective damage.., in the integrity of management, the penalties
of Section 16(b) should here be applied." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Livingston, 566 F.2d 1119, 1123 (1978).
128. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). The basic
tenents of this defense of insider trading are (1) that free insider trading is
necessary as compensation to bring entrepreneurial talent into the business
world, (2) that no one is hurt when insider speculation takes place, and (3)
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trading causes no economic harm and is necessary to reward en-
trepreneurial talent, was that such insider profit-taking causes
harm by the public appearance of unfair use of insider informa-
tion. "[I] t is just as important for the markets as for the courts not
merely to-do equity, but to appear to do equity."129 Also noting the
importance of the appearance of fairness in the markets, another
commentator discussed a persistent concern of foreign visitors
seeking ways to bring about wider public participation in capital
formation in their nations-that potential investors perceived that
only insiders do well, thereby keeping many potential investors
away from the market.130
Trading by insiders-including vice presidents-is required to
be reported by section 16(a) of the Exchange Act. It is through
this mechanism that the corporations or shareholders who bring
suit normally discover the short-swing trading.131 This information
does not remain hidden in SEC files, but is frequently reported in
the popular media contemporaneously with the trading. 3 2 The
anomaly of public reporting by vice presidents and their con-
testing of section 16(b) liability exists because there have not been
corresponding developments of the law on section 16(b) and be-
cause different policies support each section.
First, one reason persons will file as vice presidents under sec-
tion 16(a) but will litigate a section 16(b) claim on the basis that
they are not vice presidents is that some case law under section
16(a) holds that a failure to file will keep open the normal two-year
statute of limitations of section 16(b) until the plaintiff has knowl-
edge that the profit was realized.133 Thus it may be assumed that
while willing to run the risk of losing a contest of section 16(b)
liability, these insiders are unwilling to skip reporting under sec-
that in an economic sense such trading is good for the corporations involved.
5 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 2999.
129. Id..
130. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, 53 VA. L, REv. 1425, 1441 (1967).
131. See, e.g. Schimmel v. Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (defendant
filed forms under section 16(a) listing himself as a vice-president). Because
detailed information on the number of securities purchased and sold and the
dates of purchase and sale are needed to bring a section 16(b) action, it is
reasonable to assume that few section 16(b) actions are brought where a sec-
tion 16(a) filing has not been made because of a lack of information as to the
existence of the trading as well as details of the transactions.
132. E.g., a regular column in the "Pocketbook" section of the Lincoln (Neb.) Sun-
day Journal & Star, by Gene Kelly, which frequently features "Insider Trans-
actions," summarizing insider trading as reported to the SEC by selected
corporations. See Lincoln (Neb.) Sunday Journal & Star, Feb. 4, 1979, at 5C,
col. 2.
133. See, e.g., Blau v. Albert, 157 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Grossman v. Young,
72 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
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tion 16(a) and thereby risk keeping 16(b) liability open indefi-
nitely. Additionally, of course, a willful failure to file under section
16(a) would subject a person to criminal penalties under Section
32(a) of the Exchange Act 134 if found to be within the scope of sec-
tion 16(a)-a considerably different risk than disgorging any profit
made on short-swing trading.
Further, there is a policy difference between the two sections
that could lead courts--even those willing to excuse a vice presi-
dent from section 16(b) civil liability-to find that filing under sec-
tion 16(a) is necessary. One commentator concluded from an
analysis of the legislative history of the Exchange Act that section
16(a) was meant to serve the broader purpose of encouraging in-
siders to voluntarily maintain proper fiduciary standards by pub-
licizing all changes of ownership in their companies' securities. 135
Section 16(b) on the other hand was meant to be subordinate and
serve the more limited purpose of forcing return of profit only on
short-swing trading. Thus the courts which are willing to use a
subjective analysis of whether or not a vice president is an officer
under section 16(b) might not reach the same conclusion under
section 16(a).
It is reasonable to assume that the fact that vice presidents are
engaging in short-swing trading will continue to be made public
through section 16(a). 13 6 This furthers public cynicism regarding
the safety and wisdom of investing in publicly held corporations.
This damage to public confidence in corporate securities is a
strong policy reason that section 16(b) should be applied objec-
tively to any person who bears the title of vice president.
The courts which have used a subjective rule to allow vice pres-
idents to attempt escape from section 16(b) short swing trading
have reasoned that if no insider information was actually used, the
statute should not rigidly apply, and that the result of application
of the statute is too harsh in such circumstances. First, this line of
reasoning ignores the fact that the statute was meant to do far
more than just punish those who engaged in insider trading based
on a moral judgment that it was wrong. It was meant to help re-
store public confidence in the stock market as part of the goal of
renewing economic health and ensuring that economic vigor con-
134. "Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter, or any rule
or regulation thereunder ... shall upon conviction be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both ..... 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)
(1976).
135. Comment, supra note 23, at 1432 n.12.
136. The assumption is supported by the § 16(a) filing which took place in one of
the cases reported in this comment. See note 131 supra. It should be noted




tinued. While vice presidents who have no inside information and
engage in short-swing trading may not violate their fiduciary duty
to the particular corporation, they do violate the policy of the stat-
ute that the appearance of propriety is important to the nation's
economic health.
Second, the application of section 16(b) is not a harsh penalty.
One is only required to return the profit made on short-swing
transactions, 137 and is subject to no penalty as such. Further, the
onus of avoiding liability is not great. If an officer wishes to trade,
he or she may do so with freedom so long as the purchase and sale
transactions are separated by six months and one day. Of course,
the officer could also choose to invest his or her money elsewhere.
Nor is the argument persuasive that a vice president "without
portfolio" should not be covered by the statute. The position of the
SEC has been that if one "wishes to enjoy the prestige of the office,
he shares its reponsibilities under Section 16."138 Further, as in
accepting a position as a private trustee, when one becomes an of-
ficer under the pre-existing rules of section 16, "he accepts
whatever are the limitations, obligations and conditions attached
to the position .... " ,139 Indeed, the very purpose of giving one the
title of vice president-if not the responsibility-is for the prestige
that title carries with it to the employee's friends and the public at
large. "Honorary" vice presidencies were handed out, according to
the court in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Living-
ston,14o explicitly as rewards for good performance as account ex-
ecutives. 141 Certainly part of the honor is the impression conveyed
to the public that the person is a key employee of the corporation.
When one accepts the title and prestige, the responsibility of that
office to the public should be firmly enforced. To avoid further di-
minishing public confidence in the securities markets and in cor-
porate management, one accepting the title vice president-even if
only for reasons of honor and not corporate power-should be sub-
ject to the "burden" of section 16(b). 142
137. It has been suggested that the arbitrary measurement used by some courts
may extract more than the amount of the "real" profit, depending upon the
particular series of purchases and sales in the case. 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL
supra note 11, § 10.06. However, recent cases are less frequently adhering to
such a strict interpretation of the damages recoverable. Id.
138. Brief for the SEC, Amicus Curiae, at 7, Schimmel v. Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
139. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951).
140. 556 F.2d 1119 (1978).
141. Id. at 1121.
142. Since Vice Presidents are expressly included, without qualification,
in the definition of "officer" contained in Rule 3b-2, this Division has
regularly taken the position that any person who bears the title Vice
President is to be regarded as an "officer" under that rule, regardless
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It may also be asserted by some that it is not "fair" that all vice
presidents should be subject to the section since assistant secre-
taries, treasurers and comptrollers are not covered by the defini-
tion of officer as interpreted by the SEC.143 But it seems common
to have in a corporate structure numerous vice presidents who are
indeed officers with policy-making chores and access to inside in-
formation.144 The SEC, given the responsibility to define the term
by Congress, by its rule and interpretation has determined that all
those with the title vice president should be included within sec-
tion 16(b) liability.145 Given the array of variations on the vice
presidential title that are possible, it seems wise that the SEC has
not sought to draw the line elsewhere and has attempted to retain
objectivity in this respect.
V. CONCLUSION
It is suggested, in light of the foregoing discussion, that when
courts are called upon in the future to decide whether vice presi-
dents are section 16(b) officers, the question be resolved in the af-
firmative by an objective application of rule 3b-2. The next court to
consider this question should carefully review the eight officer
cases discussed above and consider them in light of the policies
Congress intended to promote through section 16(b). If such a
careful re-examination of the issue is made, the conclusion should
be reached that all vice presidents are indeed officers under sec-
tion 16(b). The policies of the statute, to provide a simple, objec-
tive rule for the return of insider profit to the corporation, and
of the method of his appointment or election, the particular duties
performed by him or whether he is named as an officer in his com-
pany's by-laws, and that as long as he enjoys the title of Vice Presi-
dent he must bear the obligations imposed by Section 16.
2 L Loss, supra note 9, at 1094 (quoting from an SEC letter reprinted in THE
CORPORATE SECRETARY, Sept. 25, 1959, at 2).
143. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-2687 (Nov. 16, 1940), and SEC Public Util-
ity Holding Co. Act Release 35-67 (Jan. 6, 1936), construed the language of
rule 3b-2 to mean that assistant treasurers, assistant secretaries and assistant
comptrollers are not to be considered "officers" under the SEC's definition of
the term. The SEC would consider, however, such persons as officers if the
person with the formal title was so inactive that he or she was actually per-
forming the superior's functions. Therefore persons entitled "assistant to the
vice president" presumably would not be covered by the SEC interpretation,
subject to the same exception of performing the functions of a superior.
144. See, e.g., Selas Corp. of America v. Voogd, 365 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(defendant had been "Vice President for European Operations" and was
later "Executive Vice President International"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner, & Smith, Inc. v. Livingston, 556 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1978) (executive
and managerial functions performed by some 350 "executive vice presi-
dents").
145. See note 142 supra.
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more broadly to promote public confidence in the securities mar-
kets and corporate management, will thereby be furthered.
If such an approach is not adopted by the courts, the SEC
should consider issuing a new administrative statement on the
subject to reiterate its long-held position that vice presidents are
officers, and to generally reemphasize rule 3b-2. As demonstrated,
the 1973 officer cases pose a danger of serious damage to the rule.
Further, the broad language of Merrill Lynch that all job labels
merely raise an inference of access to inside information and exec-
utive duties, if adopted in other factual settings, has the potential
of effectively repealing rule 3b-2. In place of the rule would be a
subjective, case-by-case analysis of who is an officer, under which
courts, if following the Merrill Lynch analysis, may ignore basic
section 16(b) policies. Such subjectivity in this definition was not
intended by Congress, and its continuation can only diminish the
section's importance.
Finally, when the Congress in coming years re-examines the
Exchange Act, as it will do should it consider the American Law
Institute's Federal Securities Code,14 it should reconsider the def-
inition of officer. The policies of a simple and objective rule, and of
promoting confidence in the markets and corporate management,
are being harmed by the injection of subjectivity into the definition
of officer. If the courts are not then applying the statute objec-
tively to all rule 3b-2 officers, and if the original purposes of section
16(b) are to be continued, "officer" should then be statutorily de-
fined by Congress.
Merrill Lynch and the officer cases of 1973 have the potential of
allowing all but one or two vice presidents of each corporation to
exit through the door of non-liability f short-swing trading occurs.
This is possible because even in a "garden variety" transaction
under the Merrill Lynch analysis, a plaintiff would have to prove
the functions, duties and potential for access to confidential infor-
mation by the vice president involved. While perhaps a small
problem, it is a door, which if it remains even partially open, may
lead to more short-swing speculation by vice presidents as well as
by other rule 3b-2 officers. Such trading potentially would further
diminish public trust and confidence in the securities markets and
146. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (1978). Section 1714 of the Code as adopted
by the ALI substantially retains section 16(b). The definition of persons re-
quired to file under section 1714 is found in section 605(a). This section sheds
no further light on the question of who is an officer, containing essentially the
same language as the insider definition now found in section 16(a).
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corporate management, in violation of the underlying policies of
section 16(b).
David E. Gardels '79
